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Abstract
The author addresses the phenomenon of taxable profit-
shifting operations undertaken by multinationals in response
to countries competing for corporate tax bases within the
European Union. The central question is whether this might
be a relic of the past when the European Commission’s pro-
posal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base sees the light of day. Or would the EU-
wide corporate tax system provide incentives for multina-
tionals to pursue artificial tax base-shifting practices within
the EU, potentially invigorating the risk of undue govern-
mental tax competition responses? The author’s tentative
answer on the potential for artificial base shifting and undue
tax competition is in the affirmative. Today, the issue of
harmful tax competition within the EU seems to have been
pushed back as a result of the soft law approaches that
were initiated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But things
might change if the CCCTB proposal as currently drafted
enters into force. There may be a risk that substantial parts
of the EU tax base would instantly become mobile as of that
day. As the EU Member States at that time seem to have
only a single tool available to respond to this – the tax rate –
that may perhaps initiate an undesirable race for the EU tax
base, at least theoretically.
Keywords: tax competition, tax planning, European Union,
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, factor manipu-
lation
JEL codes: H25, K34
1 Introduction
On Tuesday, 11 June 2013 the Foundation European
Fiscal Studies and Erasmus Law Review organised a con-
ference entitled Company Tax Integration in the EU; A
Necessary Step to Neutralize ‘Excessive’ Behaviour within
the EU? – a subject that is very interesting and quite
topical. The issues of ‘aggressive tax planning’ and
‘harmful tax competition’ have moved strikingly up
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political agendas recently.1 Many believe that multina-
tionals also should contribute their ‘fair share’ to soci-
ety, particularly in the current times of austerity where
expenditure cuts and tax raises pressurise the welfare
state.2 I was assigned the honourable task of participat-
ing in the conference and elaborating on the following
subject: Tax Competition within the European Union – Is
the CCCTB-Directive a Solution? Conference reports
have been published in EC Tax Review and the Dutch
tax weekly, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht.3
This article is the result of my endeavours. Playing the
hand that I have been dealt, I address the apparent cur-
rent issue of taxable profit-shifting operations undertak-
en by multinationals in response to countries competing
for corporate tax bases within the European Union
(EU). The central question is whether this might be a
relic of the past when the proposal released by the Euro-
pean Commission on 16 March 2011 for a Council
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB) sees the light of day,4 or would the EU-
wide corporate tax system provide incentives for multi-
nationals to pursue artificial tax base-shifting practices
within the EU, potentially invigorating the risk of
undue governmental tax competition responses? Obvi-
ously, time will tell, but for now my tentative answer to
the question whether the potential for artificial base
shifting and undue tax competition exists is in the affir-
mative. Today, the issue of harmful tax competition
within the EU seems to have been pushed back as a
result of the soft law approaches that were initiated in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. But things might change
if the CCCTB proposal as currently drafted enters into
force. There may be a risk that substantial parts of the
1. For some comments see Oliver R. Hoor and G. Bock, ‘The Misleading
Debate about Corporate Tax Avoidance by Multinationals’, 70 Tax
Notes International 907 (27 May 2013).
2. For an in-depth analysis see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard
Law Review, at 1573 (1999-2000).
3. See Martijn Schippers, ‘Company Tax Integration in the European
Union – a Necessary Step to Neutralise “Excessive” Behaviour within
the EU’ – Report on the Conference Held on Tuesday 11 June 2013 in
Rotterdam’, 22 EC Tax Review 258, at 258-263 (2013, No. 5); and
M.L. Schippers, Company Tax Integration in the European Union, Ver-
slag van de conferentie ‘Company Tax Integration in the European
Union – a Necessary Step to Neutralise ‘Excessive’ Behavior within the
EU’, gehouden op dinsdag 11 juni 2013, te Rotterdam, WFR
2013/1165.
4. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS) (‘CCCTB
proposal’). Legislative references concern the CCCTB proposal unless
expressed otherwise.
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EU tax base would instantly become mobile as of that
day. As the EU Member States at that time will have
only a single tool available to respond to that – the tax
rate – this may perhaps initiate an undesirable race for
the EU tax base, at least theoretically.
Before proceeding on the subject matter, the following
remarks should be submitted. First, it is noted that the
research question leapfrogs some pivotal issues. The
CCCTB currently exists only on the drawing board. It
is uncertain whether it shall ever enter into force. Its
adoption requires the unanimous consent of the EU
Member States – or the early adopters under the
enhanced cooperation procedures. The CCCTB pro-
posal, however, faces political resistance in various EU
Member States.5 Further, it is uncertain what the direc-
tive will eventually look like were it to be adopted. The
draft is currently being debated at the different EU
institutional levels. The European Parliament has voted
for amending the proposal on various points.6 The
Commission cannot accept some of those.7 The proposal
has also been discussed within the Council.8 Regardless,
for the purpose of the analysis in this article, it is
assumed that the CCCTB has come to light. Further-
more, unless specifically addressed otherwise, any refer-
ences to the CCCTB regard the original proposal of
16 March 2011. Finally, I scrutinise the proposal on its
own merits. It is accordingly assumed that the CCCTB
is the only corporate tax system in place within the EU.
By doing that, I basically follow the path set out by the
European Parliament and the European Economic and
Social Committee that the CCCTB would apply manda-
torily.9
Second, the language used implies that the article
should address the issue of tax competition within the
framework of the EU. Regarding outbound investments
of EU investors in non-EU countries and inbound
investments of non-EU investors in the EU, the
CCCTB would basically operate as a traditional corpo-
rate tax. The proposal’s key properties, the tax consoli-
dation and the intra-EU division of the tax base through
a sharing mechanism do not operate across the water’s
edge, that is, the outer geographical borders of the EU’s
5. Various EU Member State parliaments have issued ‘yellow cards’.
6. See European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the
proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 –
2011/0058(CNS)) (‘EP legislative resolution’).
7. See Commission Communication on the action taken on opinions and
resolutions adopted by Parliament at the April 2012 part-session
(SP(2012)388), 30 May 2012 (‘Communication SP(2012)388’).
8. See Comments of the Presidency of the Council on the CCCTB proposal
(doc. 8387/12 FISC 49) published by the Council of the European
Union, 16 April 2012, no. 2011/0058(CNS).
9. This after an introductory period; EP legislative resolution, above n. 6,
Amendments 14, 21, 22; changes proposed to recital 8, Arts. 6a (new)
and 6b (new), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolida-
ted Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121 final – 2011/0058
(CNS), ECO/302, 26 October 2011 (‘Opinion EESC’), at 1.4. Notably,
under the Commission Proposal the CCCTB would apply electively. It
would accordingly constitute the 29th corporate tax system within the
EU. Potential tax competition and tax planning effects that may result
from this are not assessed in this article.
territories. As a consequence, the tax competition and
tax planning issues that currently arise in international
taxation will likely uphold under the CCCTB regarding
third-country investment.10 For the purpose of the
present inquiry, however, this issue falls outside its
scope and is therefore not explicitly considered.
Third, I must frankly concede that I am a tax lawyer. I
am neither a trained economist nor a behavioural scien-
tist. Neither am I a statistical analyst. This article,
therefore, does not provide an in-depth empirical
impact assessment forecasting economic or behavioural
effects that the CCCTB’s application may initiate upon
its entry into force. For that purpose, I respectfully refer
to the literature on this matter.11 My aim is to forward
some tentative comments on the potential arbitrage that
in my view may be initiated under the CCCTB Direc-
tive. To substantiate my argument, I seek to carefully
and logically build the analysis. Where appropriate or
convenient, reference is made to available materials and
analyses, for instance by analogue on the United States
(US) and Canadian formulary systems from which the
CCCTB sharing mechanism has substantially been lif-
ted.
2 Tax Competition within the
EU
2.1 Tax Competition: A Matter of AETRs and
MNE Investment Location Decisions
The research question implicitly considers the phenom-
enon ‘tax competition’ to constitute a problem. It
implies that tax competition is problematical as it resorts
to the CCCTB as a potential solution, at least within the
context of the EU. This begs an answer to the question
as to what tax competition is in the first place and, sec-
ond, the extent to which this should be considered to
pose an issue.
Tax competition and its flipside phenomenon ‘tax plan-
ning’ revolve around average effective tax rates
10. See for a comparison Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the
CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and
the Ugly’, in: Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012)
221-252, at 223 and 234 (n. 72) calling this the system’s ‘Achilles heel’.
11. See e.g. Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment,
Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC(2011) 315
final, 16 March 2011; and Leon Bettendorf, Albert van der Horst, Ruud
de Mooij, Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz, The Economic Effects of
EU-Reforms in Corporate Income Tax Systems, Study for the European
Commission, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union,
Contract No. TAXUD/2007/DE/324, October 2009.
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(AETRs)12 imposed by countries on investment returns
and the investment location decisions of multinational
enterprises (MNEs). It appears that internationalisation,
the emerging global marketplace, the increased mobility
of resources and the upcoming of profit maximisation–
driven MNEs have initiated a process of tax-motivated
responses to investment location decisions, from the
sides of both the MNEs and the countries involved.13
As tax may be considered to constitute a corporate cost,
the hypothesis is that MNEs respond by allocating their
resources geographically to countries adopting compara-
tively lower AETRs on investment proceeds: ‘tax plan-
ning’. The intuition is that governments respond to this
by reducing the AETRs that they impose on investment
returns – to attract foreign investment and to preserve
domestic investment, prerequisites for the stimulation
of economic growth and job creation. This drives other
countries to join the race, pushing them to reduce their
AETRs also: ‘tax competition’. The result would be an
ongoing chain of behavioural responses of MNE invest-
ment location decisions and country tax rate reduction
decisions. The latter, as already noted, is an attempt by
these countries to attract investment to their territories
to enable themselves to subject the investment returns
to taxation for the purpose of yielding revenues to
finance expenditure: the ‘race to the bottom hypothesis’.
12. AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable (numerator) by the
pre-tax income (denominator), Willem Vermeend, Rick van der Ploeg
and Jan Willem Timmer, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the
Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption
and the Environment (2008), at 73. Notably, financing decisions
respond to marginal effective tax rates. Typical corporate tax systems
subject realised nominal returns to equity to tax accordingly favouring
debt financing over equity financing. Cf. Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the
Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax,’ 155 De
Economist 4, at 417-448 (2007); and Serena Fatica, Thomas Hemmel-
garn, and Gaetan Nicodeme, Taxation Papers; ‘The Debt-Equity Tax
Bias: Consequences and Solutions’, Working paper no. 33, July 2012,
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union.
The CCCTB operates a traditional base definition, tax-subsidising debt
financing over equity financing also. This issue is not discussed further
since it falls outside the scope of the assessment.
13. See Ruud de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research, International Tax and
Public Finance 10, no. 6, November 2003, at 277-301, Michael P.
Devereux, ‘Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Princi-
ples and Tax Policy Considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 4, 698-719, at 710-711 (2008); Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxes in
the EU New Member States and the Location of Capital and Profit’,
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper, No.
0703, Michael P. Devereux, ‘Business Taxation in a Globalized World’,
24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, at 625-638 (2008); Michael P.
Devereux, Ben Lockwood and Michela Redoano, ‘Do Countries Com-
pete Over Corporate Tax Rates?’, 92 Journal of Public Economics, at
1210-1235 (2008); and J. Voget, Headquarter Relocations and Interna-
tional Taxation, Oxford University, Centre for Business Taxation,
Oxford, 2008.
2.2 ‘Fair Tax Competition’ and ‘Harmful Tax
Competition’
2.2.1 Multinationals: Tax-Induced Shifting of Real and
‘Paper’ Investment; Tax Law: Only Latter
Problematical
The tax-induced shifts in MNE investment location
decisions may involve shifts in both real economic activ-
ities and artificial economic activities. In international
taxation the aim is to divide the corporate tax base into
taxing jurisdictions with reference to the location of
investment. In the presence of AETR differentials, such
a geographic distribution of taxable profit creates incen-
tives to locate both real and ‘paper’ investment in no-tax
or low-tax jurisdictions.
The first type of investment location distortions
involves shifting into these low-tax or no-tax jurisdic-
tions of the firm inputs like labour and capital that have
been attracted from the labour and capital markets. This
entails a tax-induced shifting of real profit towards these
jurisdictions, and a consequent shifting of taxable profit.
Various studies suggest that AETR differentials do
affect location decisions.14 That particularly is, as rents
prove, increasingly firm-specific rather than location-
specific. It should be mentioned, though, that the tax
responsiveness to real activity seems less apparent than
the tax responsiveness to locating ‘paper’ investments.
The second type – the tax responsiveness to locating
‘paper’ investment – typically involves a legal shifting of
intangible resources available within the MNE to low or
no-taxing jurisdictions. This occurs through ‘tax shel-
tering’, that is, the intra-group legal shifting towards
these jurisdictions of the firm’s financial resources or
intellectual property. Commonly utilised tools in this
14. Ibidem, as well as Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven, ‘International Profit
Shifting within Multinationals: A Multi-Country Perspective’, Economic
paper No. 264, European Commission, Directorate-General for Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs, December 2006; Michael P. Devereux and
R. Glenn Hubbard, ‘Taxing Multinationals’, NBER Working Paper Series,
Working Paper 7920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Septem-
ber 2000; Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux and Helen Simpson,
‘Taxing Corporate Income’, paper prepared for the Mirrlees Review,
Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century (2008), at 17-18; Ruud
A. de Mooij and Michael P. Devereux, ‘An Applied Analysis of ACE and
CBIT Reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and Public Finance 1, at
section 3.3 (2011); Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will Corporate Income Taxation
Survive?’, 153 De Economist, at 277-301 (2005); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines. A Pro-
posal for Reconciliation’, World Tax Journal 3, at 6 (February 2010);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Ilan Benshalom, ‘Formulary Apportionment
– Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International Tax Policies by
Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alterna-
tive’, World Tax Journal 371, at 393 (October 2011); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah and Kimberly A. Clausing, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The
Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2007-08, The Brookings Institution,
June 2007, at 9-10, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delin-
eation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-
Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review of Issues and
Options’, Working paper no. 9, October 2006, European Commission
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union, at 7, as well as OECD,
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 Feb-
ruary 2013 (‘OECD BEPS Report’), and OECD, Action Plan on Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013 (‘OECD BEPS
Action Plan’).
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respect are the setting up and tax-establishing of con-
trolled legal entities within such jurisdictions and the
subsequent arranging of intra-group legal transactions
to create tax-recognised income streams directed
towards those jurisdictions. This is established quite
easily because of the mobile characteristics of these
intangible resources and the absence of third-party mar-
ket realities in the controlled intra-firm environments
within which these transactions generally take place.
Textbook profit-shifting arrangements involve intra-
group debt financing and licensing arrangements. These
generate tax-deductible interest and royalty payments in
the countries where real investment takes place. Such
tax planning tools have been readily made available
under the tax systems of countries for MNEs to be uti-
lised to arbitrarily shift real profit to low or no-taxing
jurisdictions.
To protect their domestic tax bases, countries typically
respond by introducing anti-abuse measures – ‘sticks
regimes’ – in their corporate tax systems. Examples of
these are ‘deduction limitations’ and ‘controlled foreign
company’ rules.15 Alternatively and additionally, coun-
tries respond by imposing withholding taxes on out-
bound intra-group payments of dividends, interest and
royalties. However, the room available for these meas-
ures is often limited as their application drives AETRs
upwards, potentially rendering these countries relatively
less attractive as a location for real investment. Further,
the leeway for imposing source taxes on such outward-
bound intra-group payments often encounters legal con-
straints. This holds internationally under the double tax
convention networks of countries, which commonly
limit taxing entitlements at source regarding such pay-
ments,16 that is, save for the application of various anti-
abuse mechanisms such as ‘beneficial ownership
requirements’, ‘limitation on benefits clauses’ and ‘main
purpose tests’. The same holds within the EU as the
‘Parents-Subsidiary Directive’ and the ‘Interest and
Royalty Directive’ operate to a similar extent.17
Although both the real and artificial shifting of profits
may be considered undesirable from an economic stand-
point, tax law, both international and European, typical-
ly considers only the latter problematical. It is the tax-
induced shifting of corporate profit through intra-group
legal structuring lacking economic substance that raises
the chief concerns. These are the types of ‘excessive’
behaviours that need to be neutralised. Where MNEs
engage in artificial profit-shifting arrangements to maxi-
mise their post-tax investment returns, such behavioural
15. Regarding third-country investment relationships, the CCCTB proposal,
above n. 4, is no exception as it contains interest deduction limitations
and CFC rules also (Arts. 80-81 and 82).
16. See Arts. 10, 11, 12 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital.
17. See Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011, and Council
Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 (amended by Council Directive
2004/76/EC of 29 April 2004 and Council Directive 2006/96/EC of
20 November 2006).
responses are generally labelled as ‘aggressive tax plan-
ning’.18
2.2.2 Countries: Tax-Induced Competing for Real and
‘Paper’ Investment; Tax Law: Only Latter
Problematical
In tax law, similar views are generally expressed in
regard to tax-induced responses of governments to
MNE artificial profit-shifting operations.19 By differen-
tiating between ‘harmful tax competition’ and ‘fair tax
competition’, issues are considered to be raised predom-
inantly where countries engage in the first by adopting
measures – ‘carrots regimes’ – that unduly affect MNE
location decisions:20 the adoption of measures by coun-
tries that provide tax incentives to MNEs to artificially
shift corporate profits towards their territories. The rea-
son, obviously, is that this goes at the expense of the tax
bases and tax revenues of the origin countries where real
investments take place. Such practices are commonly
considered to produce unjustified market distortions
and revenue losses.
Harmful tax measures basically revolve around the
granting of beneficial tax treatment, ‘tax shelters’, to
cross-border economic operations that require no sub-
stantial business presence or ‘economic substance’ with-
in such countries. Typically, it involves the low or no-
taxation of proceeds from intra-group distributions of
financial resources or intellectual property. These are
internationally mobile and legally transferred easily.
And as noted earlier, the intra-group remunerations in
this regard are generally deductible for tax calculation
purposes in the countries where real investment takes
place. Such harmful regimes are typically referred to as
‘offshore regimes’, ‘group financing regimes’, ‘head-
quarter regimes’ or ‘IP holding regimes’. Sometimes
these are paired with taxpayer confidentiality mechan-
isms on the basis of which the low-taxing jurisdictions
involved do not disclose tax-relevant administrative and
financial information to other jurisdictions. Further, the
availability of such beneficial regimes is often restricted
to foreign investors. They are ‘ring-fenced’. Local
18. It is worth noting that with regard to the Dutch corporate income tax
system, the Dutch State Secretary for Finance has announced that the
Dutch government will take measures in this area. See State Secretary
for Finance letter to Parliament, 30 August 2013 (No. IFZ/2013/320).
19. See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market,
IBFD Doctoral Series, Volume 17, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2009, at 264-267,
and Carla Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, EUCOTAX Series on
European Taxation, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2003,
at 10 et seq.
20. Within the EU the selective granting of beneficial tax treatment to
attract real investment raises illegal state aid issues (Art. 107 TFEU). EU
Member States are not allowed to selectively tax-favour certain indus-
tries or branches of economic activity as these impede a neutral and fair
flow of economic activity within the internal market. Examples of
regimes potentially constituting an illegal fiscal state are the selectively
granting of ‘tax holidays’, ‘accelerated allowances’ and the establish-
ment of ‘tax-free zones’. On this matter, see e.g. Commission notice
98/C 384/03, OJ C 384 of 10 December 1998, at 3, and Report on the
implementation of the Commission notice on the application of the
state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation, C(2004)
434 of 9 February 2004.
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investors are typically ineligible to opt for their applica-
tion.
Fair competition, particularly the competition for real
investment through ‘tax rate competition’, is generally
considered beneficial from a tax law perspective. For
instance, the Commission submits in the Explanatory
Memorandum accompanying its CCCTB proposal:
‘[f]air competition on tax rates is to be encouraged. Dif-
ferences in rates allows a certain degree of tax competi-
tion to be maintained in the internal market and fair tax
competition based on rates offers more transparency and
allows Member States to consider both their market
competitiveness and budgetary needs in fixing their tax
rates’.21 Also, the Council acknowledged that fair tax
competition produces positive effects when it adopted
its ‘Code of Conduct for business taxation’, which,
among others, deals with EU-wide coordinated actions
to tackle harmful tax competition – see further details
hereunder.22
Regardless of the merits of analytically differentiating
between ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ tax competition, I go with the
territory and adhere to the views of the Commission and
the Council. I accordingly consider that concerns are
raised where it involves the tax-induced artificial profit
shifting of MNEs and the incentives created for doing
that by taxing jurisdictions. That is, also considering the
conference topic addressing ‘excessive’ behaviours,
which for the present inquiry neatly translates into
‘aggressive tax planning’ regarding MNE behaviours
and ‘harmful tax competition’ as to country responses.
2.3 Work Done in EU Addressing ‘Harmful Tax
Competition’
Both internationally, for instance within the context of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD),23 and within the EU much work has
already been done in pushing back harmful tax practi-
ces. In the late 1990s, the Council of Economics and
Finance Ministers adopted the Code of Conduct for
business taxation. With that it initiated a ‘soft law’ proc-
ess ‘peer-pressuring’ the EU Member States to roll back
existing harmful tax measures, and to dissuade them
from introducing any such measures in the future. This
process is being monitored by the Code of Conduct
Group.
21. See Explanatory Memorandum to the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, at
section 1.
22. See e.g. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December
1997 concerning taxation policy (OJ 98/C 2/01). The Code defines
harmful tax measures as ‘measures (including administrative practices)
which affect or may affect in a significant way the location of business
activity in the Community, and which provide for a significantly lower
level of taxation than those that generally apply in the Member State
concerned’.
23. Reference is made to the work of the OECD’s ‘Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices’. The Forum was created as a follow-up to a 1998 report enti-
tled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. It focuses on
transparency and information exchange. For some recent work, see
OECD Secretary-General report to the G20 Finance Ministers, 19 April
2013, at Part II: Current Tax Work of Relevance to Tackle Offshore Tax
Evasion and Tax Avoidance.
Although the Code is not legally binding, it does have
political force since all EU Member States committed to
adhere to the approach taken. The Code may be consid-
ered to have served its purpose quite well. Since the
adoption of the Code, the Code of Conduct Group has
assessed over 400 tax regimes within the EU and the EU
Member States’ overseas countries and territories.
Around 100 have been eliminated upon their identifica-
tion as constituting a harmful tax measure.24 In addi-
tion, various administrative assistance tools are current-
ly in place within the EU, enabling EU Member States
to inform and assist each other on their taxpayers’ tax
affairs.25 The presence of harmful corporate tax meas-
ures within the EU seems to have been significantly
pushed back as a result of these efforts. To substantiate
things somewhat further, it is noted that this argument
may also be induced by pointing at the shift in recent
work undertaken in this area. The work on harmful tax
practices within the EU’s institutions has recently been
concentrating on establishing approaches to counter
such practices of third countries.26
Further, efforts undertaken more recently at political
levels – again both within the EU27 and internationally
(OECD/G20)28 – increasingly focus on pushing back
tax planning strategies undertaken by MNEs through
the sophisticated utilisation to their benefit of mutual
differentials in the tax systems of countries. MNEs are
being accused of employing the disparities or ‘mis-
24. The numbers have been taken from Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Mat-
ters, COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009. Also, ‘Questions and
Answers’ (MEMO/12/949) that accompanied the Commission’s
‘December Package’ , i.e., its communication to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council entitled ‘An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight
against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion’, (COM(2012) 722 final) (‘EC Action
Plan’), its recommendation on aggressive tax planning (c(2012) 8806
final) (‘ATP Recommendation’), and its recommendation regarding
measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum
standards of good governance in tax matters (c(2012) 8805 final),
which the Commission released on 6 December 2012 (‘3rd Countries
Recommendation’). Further, Commission’s press release entitled
‘Clamping Down on Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Commission Presents
the Way Forward’ (IP/12/1325). The package followed up on the com-
munication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and
tax evasion including in relation to third countries (COM(2012) 351
final) of 27 June 2012. In addition, it is worth noting that the European
Commission views the patent box regime in place in the United King-
dom’s international tax system as harmful tax competition. See Europe-
an Commission, Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), ‘UK
– Patent Box’, Room Document # 2 of 22 October 2013. It considers
that ‘the advantages under the regime are granted even without any
real activity and substantial economic presence in the Member State
involved’. It further considers that ‘the rules for profit determination do
not adhere to internationally accepted principles’.
25. See e.g. Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 and Coun-
cil Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010.
26. See e.g. 3rd Countries Recommendation, above n. 20.
27. See e.g. ATP Recommendation, above n. 20. See also European Com-
mission, Staff working paper, ‘The Internal Market: Factual Examples of
Double Non-Taxation Cases’, Consultation Document, Brussels, TAXUD
D1 D(2012) (‘Consultation Document’).
28. See OECD BEPS Report, above n. 14; OECD BEPS Action Plan, above
n. 14; OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements; Tax Policy and Compli-
ance Issues, OECD, Paris, 2012.
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matches’ in the corporate tax systems of countries to
reduce their overall effective tax burdens without sub-
stantially altering their investments. It has been argued
that this, for instance, occurs by making use of so-called
‘Hybrid Instruments’, ‘Hybrid Entities’, ‘Hybrid
Transfers’, ‘Dual Residence Entities’, ‘(Double) Deduc-
tion/No Inclusion Transactions’ and ‘Foreign Tax
Credit Transactions’.29 The common denominator of
these arrangements is the use of differentials in coun-
tries’ taxable unit definitions, tax base definitions and
tax base allocation mechanisms.
However, as these recently and quite heavily discussed
tax practices of MNEs revolve around utilising the mis-
matches between two or more taxing systems, it may be
considered debatable whether the disparities in the tax
systems of countries, the EU Member States’ included,
should be labelled as constituting harmful tax measures.
Perhaps I am a traditionalist, but in my view, harmful
tax measures involve the utilisation by MNEs of target-
ed favourable tax benefits made available through the
tax system of a single tax jurisdiction. This is not the
case with mismatch arrangements as these involve the
use of differentials between at least two tax systems,
although the Code of Conduct Group has been discus-
sing mismatch issues lately.30
3 CCCTB – The Solution?
3.1 Would the CCCTB Provide Incentives for
Artificial Profit Shifting, Potentially
Reinvigorating Undue Tax Competition
within the EU?
The peer pressures in the 1990s and early 2000s seem to
have produced considerable success in pushing back
harmful tax measures in the EU Member States’ corpo-
rate tax systems. Within the EU the issue of harmful tax
competition may be considered to have been mitigated.
Perhaps, therefore, the research question addressed in
the introduction requires some modification; namely,
today, the issue of harmful tax competition seems to
have been successfully resolved, at least within the EU.
Hence, let me rephrase the assigned query and consider
whether the CCCTB, if enacted, would provide incen-
tives for MNEs to artificially shift corporate profits
across the EU. If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, this may trigger the potential for an undue,
or perhaps at least unforeseen, race between the EU
Member States for attracting and preserving MNE cor-
porate tax bases within their territories.
As part of the analysis, as said, I assess the CCCTB on
its individual merits. Although understanding political
realities perhaps pointing in alternative directions, I
assume that the CCCTB is operational EU-wide and
applies mandatorily – to analytically cancel out the
potential effects of a CCCTB competing with the cor-
29. Ibidem, and see Consultation Document, above n. 27.
30. See EC Action Plan, above n. 24.
porate tax systems of the 28 EU Member States.31 I will
accordingly follow the European Parliament’s tracks in
this respect.32 Further, as the CCCTB is currently
under debate and its final version is consequently indis-
tinct, I refer to the initial proposal of the European
Commission. Where relevant or convenient, reference is
made to the amendments submitted by the various par-
ties involved in the legislative process.
3.2 CCCTB: ‘A Comprehensive Solution’
The Commission envisages the CCCTB as constituting
a comprehensive solution for the inequities and inefficien-
cies that are currently present under the application of
28 different corporate tax systems in the EU.33 The tax
systems of the EU Member States currently hinder,
both in their unilateral and mutual operation, the envis-
aged fair and free cross-border intra-EU trade and
investment operations of European economic operators
within the internal market.
The Commission considers that, from a direct taxation
perspective, the full potential of the internal market may
be realised only under an EU-wide corporate tax system
for EU businesses, the CCCTB. Its key properties are,
first, a common taxable unit definition. That is, sub-
stantially as all companies that have a tax nexus within
the EU which belong to the same group, the ‘group
members’, are required to consolidate their profits and
to eliminate their intra-group transactions.34 Across the
water’s edge, as already noted, the CCCTB operates as a
traditional corporate tax adopting the concepts of ‘sepa-
rate accounting’ and the ‘arm’s length standard’ (SA/
ALS). Second, the CCCTB provides for a common tax
base definition. It has been chosen to adopt a traditional
realisation-based nominal return to equity standard, that
is, a corporate tax base definition as commonly adopted
31. Kindly note that Croatia has joined the EU per 1 July 2013.
32. European Parliament proposed to amend the initial CCCTB proposal for
various reasons, among them to arrive at a mandatory application of
the CCCTB for all (but small and medium-sized enterprises) after a brief
transition period; EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendments 14,
21, 22; changes proposed to recital 8, Arts. 6a (new) and 6b (new). The
Commission cannot accept this; Communication SP(2012)388, above
n. 7.
33. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, ‘Towards an Inter-
nal Market without Tax Obstacles; A Strategy for Providing Companies
with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide Activities’,
COM(2001) 582 final, 23 October 2001. Here the Commission estab-
lished its policy for developing the CCCTB. It confirmed it in its Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the European Economic and Social Committee, ‘An Internal
Market without Company Tax Obstacles Achievements, Ongoing Initia-
tives and Remaining Challenges’, COM(2003)726 final, 24 November
2003.
34. Administratively, the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, adopts the ‘one-
stop-shop’ approach for tax return filing purposes. The return may be
filed with the tax authorities of a single EU Member State. This would
be the country in which the parent company of the group, the ‘principal
taxpayer’, resides for tax purposes.
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in the current tax systems of the EU Member States.35
Third, the tax base is subsequently shared among the
EU Member States on the basis of a predetermined for-
mula. The formula factors seek to apportion the tax base
by reference to firm inputs (assets, labour) at origin and
firm outputs (revenues) at destination. The sharing
mechanism has essentially been lifted from the formu-
lary mechanisms to divide taxable corporate profits to
subnational levels of government that are currently in
place in the US and Canada. Conforming to the lan-
guage used in these countries, the approach taken may
be referred to as ‘formulary apportionment’ (US) or
‘formulary allocation’ (Canada), commonly abbreviated
as FA.
Through the adoption of a single set of rules on corpo-
rate taxation throughout the EU, tax competition within
the EU’s territories under the CCCTB is pictured to
revolve solely around transparent tax rate competition.
That is, since the only tool available for EU Member
States to influence intra-EU MNE location decisions
would be the tax rate that the EU Member States may
autonomously apply to the harmonised consolidated tax
base that has been assigned to their territories under the
common sharing mechanism.
Notably, the European Parliament has voted in favour
of introducing the possibility for EU Member States to
make use of tax credits to reduce the post-shared tax
base, that is, to enable them to adopt certain incentives for
businesses.36 Research on equivalents in the Canadian
formulary allocation system suggests that such a tool
would likely initiate tax competition between EU Mem-
ber States for intra-EU investment.37 The Commission
has submitted that it cannot accept this amendment for
technical reasons.38 In my view, the utilisation of tax
credits for businesses may entail the risk of triggering
fiscal state aid issues and should therefore be considered
a route not to be followed.39
3.3 CCCTB: Incentives for Artificial Tax Base
Shifting?
3.3.1 Various Issues Would Be Resolved under the
CCCTB
Such a more or less unitary approach where the group’s
profits are shared geographically by means of a formu-
35. As the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, subjects the nominal return to
equity to tax, it tax-favours debt financing over equity financing. Fur-
ther, under the adoption of SA/ALS also, intra-firm debt financing is
recognised for tax base definition and tax base allocation purposes. As
these arrangements do not add value to the firm, their tax recognition
provides an incentive for MNE firms to engage in ‘CCCTB-base erosion
and profit shifting’ through intra-group debt financing arrangements
across the water’s edge. The CCCTB follows traditional responses by
introducing interest deduction limitations to protect their domestic tax
bases.
36. See EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendment 9; changes pro-
posed to recital 5.
37. See Joan Martens Weiner, ‘Taxation Papers; Formulary Apportionment
and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United
States and Canada’, Working paper no 8, March 2005, European Com-
mission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union, at Chapter 6.
38. See Communication SP(2012)388, above n. 7.
39. See also Weiner, above n. 37, at 51-52 (footnote 75).
lary mechanism (‘unitary taxation’) reflecting inputs and
outputs is generally considered to produce less opportu-
nity for engaging in artificial tax avoidance operations.40
That is, first, in comparison with the SA/ALS system
as currently in place both internationally and within the
EU. The cancelling out of the recognition of intra-
group legal reality within the EU would entail a signifi-
cant step towards mitigating many of the current issues
in international taxation, as it takes away the key tools
currently employed by countries and MNEs for engag-
ing in artificial profit shifting.41 The relocating of the
firm’s intangible resources through controlled legal
transactions would be rendered impossible. It may be
noted that aggressive tax planning operations typically
do not occur outside the controlled environment within
the functionally integrated MNE firm.42 With respect to
third-party transactions, it may be argued that a suffi-
cient ‘self-policing mechanism’ exists in the form of the
opposing underlying economic interests that drive
third-party market transactions in a competitive busi-
ness environment.43
Secondly, a coordinated approach would put an end to
the unfair ‘overtaxation’ and ‘undertaxation’ of proceeds
from intra-EU cross-border investment relative to
domestic investment proceeds. It would also halt the
tax-induced distortions that result from differentials in
taxable unit definitions, tax base definitions and tax allo-
cation mechanisms. Indeed, the disparities and mis-
matches hammering the uncoordinated international tax
regime would be effectively brought to an end under a
coordinated EU-wide corporate taxation approach. The
sole tax differential remaining within the EU would be a
rate differential.
Thirdly, a known property of formulary regimes to geo-
graphically divide MNE profit is that they provide an
incentive to locate apportionment factors in low-taxing
jurisdictions.44 Indeed, the theoretical literature and
40. See e.g., Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 222.
41. Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of
Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62, at 62-84
(2011).
42. See for a comparison Mayer, above n. 19, at 177: ‘Profit shifting
between two entities mainly takes place when they are under common
control, whereas below that level external shareholders can be expected
to oppose measures that artificially reduce one company’s profits or
increase its tax burden.’ See also Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind
as Those Who Will Not See’, 66 Tax Notes 1023, at 1030 (February 13,
1995): ‘For entities that are 50-percent-or-less owned, a self-policing
mechanism exists in the form of the other shareholders.’
43. Perhaps some arbitrage may arise to the extent that the CCCTB group
definition would prove not to align with the firm as a single economic
unit. This is not discussed further as I tentatively consider this possibility
to be of some lesser concern than the potential for arbitrage under the
sharing mechanism discussed hereunder. For some analysis on the
CCCTB Group definition, see Workshop on the Common Consolidated
Corporation Tax (CCCTB), Room Document 1: ‘Eligibility Tests for
Companies and Definition of a CCCTB Group’, TaxudD1/ CCCTB/RD
\001\doc\en, 30 August 2010. On group definitions generally see De
Wilde, above n. 41, at 62-84.
44. See Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 233. See also Opinion EESC, above n. 9,
at 1.2.6, as well as Albert van der Horst, Leon Bettendorf, and Hugo
Rojas-Romagosa, ‘Will Corporate Tax Consolidation Improve Efficiency
in the EU?’, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2007-076/2, Sep-
tember 2007.
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empirical research available on formulary systems sug-
gest that in the presence of AETR differentials, MNEs
engage in profit shifting through factor shifting where
tax jurisdictions respond by tax-competing with each
other to attract and preserve investment.45 Also, formu-
lary systems bring tax competition.
These profit-shifting incentives would disappear under
an EU-wide harmonised tax rate – the potential path
suggested by the European Parliament46 – or the adop-
tion of a revenue-sharing mechanism.47 Derivatively,
location distortions would be mitigated to the extent
that rate bandwidths or minimum rates would be intro-
duced.
The Commission, however, has expressed that it cannot
accept rate coordination.48 It considers that the CCCTB
proposal is meant not to touch upon tax rates. It sets
forth that ‘[t]he determination of tax rates is treated as a
matter inherent in Member States’ tax sovereignty and
is therefore left to be dealt with through national legisla-
tion’.49 Rate harmonisation would also likely face politi-
cal resistance in the EU Member States as this would
involve a substantial transfer of fiscal autonomy from
the states to the union.
3.3.2 In Search of Arbitrage Potentials under the Sharing
Mechanism
3.3.2.1 Subject of Analysis: Only Potentials for
Artificial Tax Base Shifting
Under the ‘fair’ versus ‘harmful’ tax competition para-
digm, tax-induced factor shifting may not be considered
problematical if and insofar as the location distortions
would involve the shifting of real inputs and outputs.50
However, the converse may be considered to hold to the
extent that the CCCTB would enable MNE firms to
45. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in
Wolves’ Clothing’, in: Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin (eds.), The
Economics of Taxation (1980), at 327-346; R. Gordon and J.D. Wilson,
‘An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under
Formula Apportionment’, 54 Econometrica 6, at 1357-1373 (1986);
Austan Goolsbee, and Edward Maydew, ‘Coveting Thy Neighbor’s
Manufacturing: The Dilemma of State Income Apportionment’, 75
Journal of Public Economics, at 125-143 (2000); Kelly Edmiston, ‘Stra-
tegic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax’, 55 National
Tax Journal 2, at 239-262 (2002). For comprehensive overviews, refer-
ence is made to Garcia, above n. 14; and Weiner, above n. 37.
46. European Parliament proposed to introduce the possibility for future
rate harmonisation; EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendment
10; changes proposed to recital 5a (new). If the CCCTB would apply
mandatorily as well, that would effectively introduce a fully centralised
‘EU Company Income Tax’ (EUCIT).
47. See for a comparison Thomas Horst, ‘A Note on The Optimal Taxation
of International Investment Income’, 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics
4, at 793-798 (June 1980); Devereux, above n. 13, at 706; and Mal-
colm Gammie, ‘Corporate Taxation in Europe – Paths to a Solution’,
British Tax Review, at 233-249 (2001).
48. See Communication SP(2012)388, above n. 7.
49. See Explanatory memorandum to the CCCTB Proposal, above n. 4, at
section 3.
50. This effect may be considered to occur if and to the extent that the
CCCTB’s sharing mechanism would actually attribute the tax base geo-
graphically to the locations of real inputs and real outputs (though in
my view it does not, as discussed hereunder) – i.e., in the presence of
AETR differentials. See for a comparison Horst et al., above n. 44, at
2-3.
engage in artificial factor-shifting operations, being
encouraged to do so by EU Member States setting the
comparatively lowest of EU AETRs.
Accordingly, only the potential for artificial tax base
shifting within the EU through factor manipulation may
be considered problematical. It is noted that to the
extent that the CCCTB would promote artificial factor
shifting, this may be considered quite a problem indeed.
This may particularly be considered to hold since the
CCCTB seems to lack sufficient tools to counter such
practices, were these to come to pass. The CCCTB’s
anti-abuse provisions, for instance, like the ‘General
Anti-Abuse Rule’ – targeting artificial legal arrange-
ments set up to avoid tax – seem to merely refer to
excessive behaviours concerning the tax base calcula-
tion.51 The abuse of apportionment rules seems to fall
outside the confines of the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules.52
Furthermore, the ‘Safeguard Clause’ in the proposal,
which is directed at correcting unfair outcomes under
the general formula, seems to apply only when all the
EU Member States’ authorities involved agree.53
Accordingly, the safeguard clause seems to require
unanimous consent. Moreover, some uncertainties exist
as to whether the rulemaking authority of the Commis-
sion regarding the sharing mechanism would enable it to
adopt substantial changes to the legislative act.54 I am
not a cynic, but it may be fair to say that it remains to be
seen how much room will effectively be available at the
end of the day to resolve the issues that might emerge
concerning MNE factor manipulation activities and EU
Member State tax competition responses.
3.3.2.2 Formulary Apportionment: Dividing Profit
Fairly by Reference to Inputs at Origin and
Outputs at Destination
Generally, formulary mechanisms seek to divide corpo-
rate profit among tax jurisdictions by using a predeter-
mined fixed formula.55 Like any corporate tax base divi-
sion mechanism, formulary systems seek to establish a
taxable presence concept to geographically locate the
firm’s economic presence within a jurisdiction (‘nexus’).
Furthermore, formulary systems seek to establish a
methodology to subsequently evaluate the income that
the respective firm derives at that particular geographic
location (‘allocation’), that is, to geographically allocate
the taxable profit to that jurisdiction.
For this purpose, formulary systems typically apportion
corporate earnings with reference to firm inputs and
firm outputs, respectively, reflecting the supply and
51. See Arts. 80-83.
52. Cf. ‘Comment by Dennis Weber on the CCCTB Proposal’, Vakstudie
H& I, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation, 2011/6.1, at 57.
Perhaps some room upholds under the EU’s ‘abuse of law doctrine’.
Matters seem indistinct here, though. For some analysis see Peter Har-
ris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in:
Weber (ed.), above n. 9, at 271-297.
53. See Art. 87.
54. See Art. 97. Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 232, and Chapter 5.
55. See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined
Reporting by Nation-States’, in: Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville and
Eric M. Zolt (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties
(2003), at 245-298.
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demand sides of income production.56 Essentially, they
seek to approximate the inputs geographically with ref-
erence to the remunerations that the firm pays in return
for utilising its workers and assets in the business proc-
ess (‘allocation’). Conceptually, the aim is to localise
these workers and assets at origin, that is, where they
exercise their employment contracts and where the
assets are functionally utilised in the business process
(‘nexus’). Outputs are in essence sought to be approxi-
mated with reference to the remunerations, that is, the
gross receipts that the firm receives in return for the
goods and services it provides (‘allocation’). Conceptual-
ly, the aim is to localise the firm’s customers at destina-
tion, that is, where these customers utilise or consume
the goods and services that were provided to them
(‘nexus’). As regards the assigning of outputs at destina-
tion, the analytical comparability with the value-added
taxation system in the EU (‘EU-VAT’) is apparent.
Formulary apportionment accordingly recognises
income production as the outcome of the interplay of
both supply and demand.57 It attributes income to both
the country of investment (‘origin state’) and the coun-
try where the goods and services are marketed (‘destina-
tion state’). Further, formulary systems modestly seek
to provide a fair geographical division of income rather
than identifying the ‘true’ geographic source of income
– recognising that corporate income essentially lacks
geographical attributes.58 The weighting of factors,
accordingly, is considered a matter of judgment.59
Notably, profit division on the basis of formulary mech-
anisms conceptually differs from the profit division
approaches in international taxation. Internationally, the
corporate tax base is sought to allocate income merely
with reference to the tax jurisdictions of origin (i.e., the
location of firm inputs). The international tax regime
makes use of the concepts of nationality, residence and
56. It would be consistent to apportion both profits as losses. The CCCTB,
however, only apportions profits under the sharing mechanism (Art.
86(2)). Losses are carried forward on a non-shared basis. This creates
complexities where mergers and acquisitions are involved in the pres-
ence of ring-fenced loss carry forwards. These need to be geographical-
ly divided to make sure that CCCTB losses do not cross EU Member
State tax borders, see Chapters X and XI CCCTB Proposal, above n. 4.
This is not discussed further. See on this matter Jan van de Streek, ‘The
CCCTB Concept of Consolidation and the Rules on Entering a Group’,
40 Intertax I, at 24-32 (2012); and Jan van de Streek, ‘The CCCTB
Rules on Leaving a Group’, 40 Intertax 6/7, at 421-430 (2012).
57. Cf. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax
Base’, in: Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income
Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984), at 228-246.
58. Cf. e.g., McIntyre, above n. 55, at 253, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Internation-
al Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The Case for Formulary
Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103
103-111, at 104 (2005); and Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Interjurisdictional
Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the Europe-
an Union’, in: Sijbren Cnossen (ed.) Taxing Capital Income in the Euro-
pean Union, Issues and Options for Reform (2000), at 46-77.
59. Cf. Garcia, above n. 14, at 33. See for a comparison Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base, Working Group, Working Paper No. 60,
‘CCCTB: Possible Elements of the Sharing Mechanism’, TAXUD TF1/
GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, 13 November 2007 (‘WP 060’), at 6:
‘The Commission Services consider that the weighting of the factors is
not a technical issue and recommend that any discussion on the weight-
ing be carried out at political level...’
situs to establish corporate taxable presence within a
taxing jurisdiction (‘nexus’). The concept of SA/ALS
has been used almost universally to subsequently evalu-
ate the firm’s geographical presence at origin (‘alloca-
tion’). The above-mentioned carrots and sticks regimes
apply regarding the artificialities and ensuing distortions
that the nexus and allocation processes produce. The
countries where the firm’s goods and services are mar-
keted – the destination states – are typically neglected in
international taxation.
Also, the CCCTB sharing mechanism divides corporate
profits within the EU through a ‘nexus’ and ‘allocation’
process. The CCCTB formula echoes the traditional
equally weighted three-factor ‘Massachusetts formula’
developed in US state income taxation in the 1950s.60 In
the original CCCTB proposal, the formula takes the fol-
lowing form:61
3.3.2.3 Conceptual Peculiarities in the Sharing
Mechanism
Regardless of the merits of composing the formula
accordingly,62 some peculiar elements may be recog-
nised in the sharing mechanism. Before I proceed,
kindly note that I will not engage in a comprehensive
analysis of the formula factors or their weighting – US
practices for instance reveal a tendency towards favour-
ing the putting of higher weights on the sales factor;
60. See for some reading and analysis Walter Hellerstein and Charles E.
McLure, Jr., ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income
Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US
States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance, at 199-220 (2004),
Garcia, above n. 14; and Weiner, above n. 37.
61. See Art. 86(1).
62. European Parliament proposed to increase the weight on inputs (labour:
45%, assets: 45%) and reduce the weight on outputs (sales: 10%); see
EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendments 16 and 31; changes
proposed to recital 21 and 86. Parliament argues that this would be
more in line with the attribution in international taxation of taxing enti-
tlements to the country of source. Notably, the Committee on the Inter-
nal Market and Consumer Protection proposed to take out the sales
factor altogether for similar reasons and for the factor being perceived
to be manipulable: ‘An independent sales agent (located in a non-
CCCTB State) could be contracted as an intermediary to do the sales on
behalf of the group to the relevant market, and thereby move the desti-
nation of the sales from the ‘intended’ state to the state of choice’,
Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Pro-
tection for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the
proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB), (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 –
2011/0058(CNS)), 25 January 2012. I am not sure whether such
manipulation would significantly arise. Further, I doubt whether this
behaviour should qualify as aggressive tax planning – to the extent that
it would arise. That is, since such a scenario would involve third-party
market transactions, real economic activity accordingly, underlying the
sharing of the tax saving. In addition, the intermediary third party
would charge a fee for its services as it would bear the economic risk
involving the performance of its full-fledged distribution function. In
other words, without the passage of economic risk, there may be be no
third-party sale. Further, such a tax planning operation would likely trig-
ger additional transportation costs. Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237.
Regardless, the Commission cannot accept the amendment; Communi-
cation SP(2012)388, above n. 7, considering an equally weighted three-
factor formula the most appropriate solution.
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today, many states even adopt sales-only formulae.63
Furthermore, I will not go into the details regarding the
definitions used or the factors’ scopes of application. I
will also not pursue an in-depth analysis in regard to
their evaluation and geographic localisation.64 My aim is
merely to submit some remarks on the properties that I
regard as potentially producing undue or at least unfore-
seen arbitrage.
3.3.2.4 Using International Taxation Concepts to
Establish Nexus
As already seen, some conceptual peculiarities may be
recognised in the CCCTB sharing mechanism.
First, it is noted that the CCCTB proposal uses the
same nexus concepts that are currently in place in inter-
national taxation to establish tax jurisdiction. As regards
the establishing of the firm’s taxable presence within an
EU Member State, the proposal does not refer to the
presence of workforce, assets or turnover in that coun-
try. That, for instance, would be the case under the
alternative application of ‘factor presence tests’.65 It
should be noted that the use of such an approach would
be conceptually more sound, as these tests appreciate
the ratio underlying formulary apportionment to a
greater extent. Factor presence tests directly refer to the
geographical location firm inputs and firm outputs for
taxable profit division purposes – see further details
hereunder.
63. See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV
– Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, at 10-14 (‘MTC 2012a’),
and Multistate Tax Commission, ‘Multistate Tax Compact Article IV
Recommended Amendments as Approved for Public Hearing’ – Decem-
ber 6, 2012 (‘MTC 2012b’). For an overview of the formulae adopted
by the US states as of January 1, 2013, see David Spencer, ‘Unitary
Taxation with Combined Reporting: The TP Solution?’, 25 International
Tax Review, at 2-5 (April 2013).
64. See for some analysis Antonio Russo, Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base: The Sharing Mechanism, Some General Considerations, in:
Weber (ed.), above n. 9, at 207-219, and the literature references in
that publication.
65. Under a ‘factor presence test’, tax nexus within a taxing jurisdiction
would arise where any of the factors (property, payroll, sales) or a com-
bination thereof is present within that jurisdiction, subject to a de mini-
mis threshold (wages paid, assets values, turnover). See e.g. Mayer,
above n. 19, at 202-205, Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Elec-
tronic Commerce,’ 52 Tax Law Review 425 at (1996-1997), and
Charles E. McLure, ‘Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the
Digital Age,’ 53 National Tax Journal 4, at (2000). See also WP 060,
above n. 59, at 15; and Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk,
A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at Appendix D.
For some comparison, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation
of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507, at (1996-1997); and
Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment
Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 7, at 266-279 (2006).
The CCCTB proposal makes use of international tax
nexus concepts and attributes the tax base to group mem-
bers, that is, the companies that are part of the CCCTB
group.66 The geographical presence of these group
members is recognised with reference to their tax place
of residence within an EU Member State or their pres-
ence in an EU Member State through a ‘permanent
establishment’. Corresponding with common interna-
tional tax practices, the localisation of a ‘group member’
with reference to its tax residence is determined on the
basis of the respective company’s ‘place of incorpora-
tion’ or its ‘place of effective management’; the same
holds for the permanent establishment concept. Follow-
ing international tax law approaches, the localisation of a
‘group member’ under the CCCTB proposal occurs by
assessing whether a business venture is being conducted
by a non-resident group company through a ‘fixed place
of business’ – like a store or branch – situated within the
territories of an EU Member State.
3.3.2.5 Using Factor Allocation Approaches
Inconsistent with Inputs at Origin and Outputs at
Destination
Second, the CCCTB proposal does not consistently
allocate the formula factors geographically to the inputs
at origin and outputs at destination. A discrepancy
seems to have been created between the taxable profit
division under the formula factors in the sharing
mechanism and the geographic location of real firm
inputs and firm outputs. This holds, for instance, for
the labour factor and the sales factor.
The labour factor does not seem to allocate the tax base
to the jurisdiction of origin where the firm’s workers
physically exercise their employment contracts. Instead,
employees and payroll are allocated to the group mem-
ber(s) from which the employees receive their remuner-
ations. To the extent that employees substantially exer-
cise their employment contracts under the contro and
responsibility of group member(s) other than the group
member(s) paying the salaries and wages, the factor is
allocated to the first mentioned group member(s).67
66. See Art. 86(1), Arts. 4-6 and 54-55 in conjunction with Chapter XVI.
Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 225.
67. See Arts. 90-91. Notably, fixed assets are allocated to the EU Member
State of the group member(s) effectively owning them, see Arts. 92-94
in conjunction with 4(20). If the economic owner does not substantially
utilise these assets in its business process, they are attributed to the
group member(s) that effectively does. Intangible assets are not
expressly allocated under the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4. As a conse-
quence, these piggyback on the profit division in proportion to the fac-
tors expressly dealt with.
Share Group Member A
= + + 
1
3( ( )12SalesASalesGroup PayrollAPayrollGroup No of employeesANo of employeesGroup13 12
+ CCCT B* )AssetsAAssetsGroup13
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The sales factor does not seem to consistently allocate
tax base to the jurisdiction of destination where the
firm’s customers functionally utilise or consume the
goods and services provided to them.68 For example, the
sales factor allocates exempt revenues such as exempt
gross proceeds from (third-country) shareholdings (e.g.,
dividends, capital gains),69 revenues from – loosely
phrased – portfolio investments and hedging transac-
tions to the beneficiary. That is, to the extent that these
revenues have been earned in the ordinary course of trade
or business.70
As I am not entirely sure how to interpret the ‘benefici-
ary’ receiving such revenues ‘in the ordinary course of
trade or business’ under the sales factor, I tentatively
follow the suggestions that Hellerstein has submitted in
this regard and the analogous guidance provided by the
Court of Justice in the area of EU-VAT on portfolio
investment activities.71 Using transfer pricing terminol-
ogy, I take it to mean that these types of gross receipts
are attributed to the group member that beneficially
owns these72 and functionally performs the MNE’s
(third-country) shareholding management functions,
treasury functions, cash-pooling functions and/or func-
tionally manages the MNE’s hedging positions. These
types of functions performed may be considered to con-
stitute the key components of the firm’s ordinary trade
or business operations.73 Should this hold, the sales fac-
tor at this point effectively utilises an origin-based con-
necting factor.
3.3.3 Potential for Arbitrage: Factor Manipulation
Would these peculiarities and inconsistencies in the
sharing mechanism produce arbitrage potentials? Is
there a possibility for employing them to arbitrarily shift
68. Services e.g. are allocated to the group member located in the EU
Member State where the services are physically carried out, Art. 96(2).
Such a ‘place of performance rule’ reflects the origin side rather than
the supply side. The recognition of the supply side in this respect – the
destination of income – would allocate the factor to the location of the
customer or the EU Member State where the services are marketed. In
EU-VAT, e.g., services are often tax-located in the country where the
customer is located. This is not discussed further as the location of serv-
ices physically performed, albeit being the country of origin seems hard
to manipulate.
69. See Art. 11(c)(d).
70. See Art. 95(2) in conjunction with Art. 96(3).
71. See, respectively, Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237-241, and Court of
Justice, cases C-60/90 (Polysar), C-155/94 (Wellcome Trust Ltd.),
C-306/94 (RégieDauphinoise), C-80/95 (Harnas & Helm), and
C-142/99 (Floridienne).
72. Note that I refer by analogue to the ‘beneficial ownership’ concept in
international taxation.
73. See Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 239. To substantiate the argument, Hel-
lerstein refers by analogue to Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,
39 Cal. 4th 750, 139 P.3d 1169, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (2006). Ana-
logues to Court of Justice jurisprudence on EU VAT, the performing of
portfolio asset management and shareholding management functions
may perhaps be considered part of ordinary trade or business opera-
tions where these functions performed ‘are effected as part of a com-
mercial share-dealing activity, in order to secure a direct or indirect
involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding
has been acquired or where they constitute the direct, permanent and
necessary extension of the taxable activity’. See Polysar, above n. 71,
Wellcome Trust Ltd., above n. 71; RégieDauphinoise, above n. 71; and
Floridienne, above n. 71.
the tax base to the comparatively lower-taxing EU
Member State, potentially igniting unforeseen tax com-
petition responses? Would the CCCTB produce a
potential for a ‘race to the bottom 2.0’ under the
CCCTB?
Of course, matters remain to be seen. However, a poten-
tial may be recognised for tax planning operations and
tax competition responses. In my opinion, the arbitrage
would revolve around:
1. ‘Labour factor manipulation’ through ‘payroll group
members’;
2. ‘Sales factor manipulation’ through ‘beneficiary
group members’;
3. ‘Sales factor inflation’ through ‘beneficiary group
members’ engaging in ‘shareholding-revenues-carou-
sels’.
Before proceeding to a description of the potential plan-
ning strategies, it may be noted that all, essentially, are
rooted in the use of the same nexus concepts as utilised
in international taxation today, that is, the tax place of
residence and the permanent establishment. The arbi-
trage that the use of this approach creates is not reversed
in the subsequent tax base allocation process.
First, as regards the geographical localisation of a group
member within an EU Member State’s tax jurisdiction
with reference to its tax residence, it may be deduced
from well-known tax practices that it may not prove too
difficult for MNEs to influence this. That is, as this
matter would revolve substantially around ceremonial
events like the chosen company laws governing the
respective legal entity or the geographic location where
the decisions concerning its governance are taken.74
These events may be relatively easily directed towards
the tax jurisdiction(s) of choice, regardless of the loca-
tion of real investment. Particularly the international
convergence of company laws, the cross-border mobility
of corporate managers – ‘fly-in-fly-out management’ –
and the digitisation of the global economy render these
tax-connecting factors rather meaningless and easily
steered. As a result, the CCCTB proposal seems to pro-
vide MNEs a readily available tool to geographically
locate group members in a ‘home country’ at their dis-
cretion to influence the tax base allocation under the
sharing mechanism; that is, if the subsequent sharing
process would not resolve things – which to my mind is
the case.
Second, as to the geographical localisation of a ‘group
member’ within an EU Member State tax jurisdiction
by reference to the presence of a permanent establish-
ment, it may be deduced from known tax practices that
this may likely produce rather arbitrary results also. The
permanent establishment concept requires the establish-
ment of a physical–geographical presence within a tax
jurisdiction. The mere presence of workers within a
country is typically insufficient to make a permanent
74. Cf. McIntyre, above n. 55, at 270.
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establishment, though.75 Further, note that the emer-
gence of the Internet and e-commerce has diminished
the need for establishing a tangible presence within a
country to enter its market.76 A virtual presence through
a website may often suffice, particularly where it con-
cerns e-tailers supplying IT services or e-goods.77 As a
potential consequence, the proceeds from e-commerce
activities may be left virtually untaxed in the ‘host coun-
try’. Like the current international tax regime, the
CCCTB proposal misses the digital economy complete-
ly.78 Let us proceed and scrutinise the potential for fac-
tor manipulation – in increasing relevance.
3.3.3.1 Ad 1. ‘Labour Factor Manipulation’ through
‘Payroll Group Members’
Payroll, as already noted, would be apportioned to the
group member(s) paying the salaries and wages and,
alternatively, the group member(s) under whose ‘control
and responsibility’ the employees exercise their employ-
ment contracts. As regards the latter, that is, the appor-
tioning of the labour factor to the ‘substantive employer
group member’ would occur, provided that the required
reassignment thresholds are met. Please note that the
location of work performed, as mentioned earlier, seems
irrelevant.
The apportioning of tax base with reference to the
group member paying the salaries or, alternatively,
under whose control and responsibility the employment
contracts are exercised may invite MNEs to set up and
tax-establish ‘payroll group members’ in the compara-
tively lower-taxing jurisdiction to which the workforce
is subsequently assigned,79 even though the firm’s work-
ers may actually exercise their employment contracts
across the EU. Perhaps, this may hold even in the case
of workers who are posted on the basis of intra-group
secondment contracts. Note that the presence of work-
ers within a country, as discussed, does not in itself trig-
ger the presence of a permanent establishment.
Although a ‘substantive employer’ concept has been put
in place, I have some doubts whether the concept is suf-
ficiently robust to effectively counter such labour factor
manipulation operations.
The magnitude of the risk of triggering labour factor
manipulation involving payroll group members may
prove to ultimately depend on the interpretation of the
75. That is, perhaps save for the ‘services permanent establishment’ laid
down in Art. 5(3)(b) of the United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. The opera-
tion of this nexus concept establishes tax jurisdiction regarding ‘[t]he
furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise
through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for
such purpose, but only if activities of that nature continue (for the same
or a connected project) within a Contracting State for a period or peri-
ods aggregating more than 183 days in any 12-month period com-
mencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned’.
76. See Avi-Yonah, above n. 2, at 1596.
77. An e-tailer is an enterprise that conducts its business online.
78. See e.g. Lee A. Sheppard, ‘The Digital Economy and Permanent Estab-
lishment’, 70 Tax Notes International 297 (Apr. 22, 2013), Charles
McLure, Jr., ‘Alternatives to the Concept of Permanent Establishment’,
1 CESifo Forum 3, at 10-16 (2000); Avi-Yonah, above n. 65; and Pinto,
above n. 65.
79. See for a comparison Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 242-243.
terms ‘control and responsibility’ in the text of the draft
directive. The risk may be greater to the extent that
these terms would need to be interpreted narrowly c.q.
legally, for instance with reference to the exercising of
legal control and responsibility of the group member
involved. But the risks may significantly arise even
under a less restricted interpretation i.e., were the tax
base, for instance, attributed to the group member to
whom the economic risks involving the utilisation of the
MNE’s workforce have been assigned. In transfer pric-
ing, it is well known that the economic risks involving
the conducting of economic activity are quite mobile
and can be legally assigned to group companies by
MNE discretion.
The consequence of using such a labour factor allocation
test may be that one-third of the EU-wide tax base
becomes instantly mobile as of the entry into force of
the CCCTB. The reality of such a planning tool, as
already noted, may prove to ultimately depend on the
interpretation of the terms ‘control and responsibility’.
The issue, for instance, may be substantially mitigated
to the extent that these would need to be interpreted as
corresponding with the location where the employment
contracts are physically performed. However, as this
does not seem to correspond with the language used in
the text of the draft directive, the potential for arbitrage
may be considered present, at least theoretically.
Of course, it could be decided to wait and see how the
Court of Justice shall interpret the language used when
it is called upon. Perhaps the court will resolve the mat-
ter by extensively interpreting the directive text, for
example, with reference to its ratio. Or perhaps not.
Perhaps, therefore, it may be worth assessing the possi-
bility of altering the sharing mechanism, an approach
that I would recommend taking. Perhaps it may be con-
sidered to adopt a ‘factor presence test’ to share the
intra-EU tax base. On the basis of such a test, the taxa-
ble presence of a firm within an EU Member State
would be established with reference to the presence of a
workforce within a tax jurisdiction. Nexus would be
based on the physical presence of the firm’s workers
exercising their employment contracts within a taxing
jurisdiction. The establishment of the firm’s taxable
presence could be subject to a de minimis threshold
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(‘payroll EU Member State A exceeding amount € x’).80
The subsequent allocation of the taxable base to that
state could be loosely inspired on the distributive rules
for employment income found in Article 15 OECD
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (see
the formula above). That would perhaps effectively can-
cel out artificial tax base-shifting incentives within the
EU through labour factor manipulation. Namely, under
the application of such a factor presence test, the shift-
ing of the taxable base would require a physical reloca-
tion of MNE workers from one EU Member State to
another – a shifting of real inputs accordingly.81
3.3.3.2 Ad. 2 ‘Sales Factor Manipulation’ through
‘Beneficiary Group Members’
Gross receipts from portfolio investments and revenues
from hedging instruments, as noted, are apportioned to
the ‘beneficiary’. This holds to the extent that the group
member derives these revenues ‘in the ordinary course
of trade or business’.
The apportioning of the tax base under the sales factor
to the group member that is entitled to the gross pro-
ceeds from these intangibles may invite MNEs to set up
and tax-establish ‘beneficiary group members’ in the
comparatively lower EU Member State taxing jurisdic-
tion. It is also conceivable that MNE groups would set
up special vehicles for tax planning purposes to which
the portfolio investments and hedging positions are
being legally assigned. The assets involved have quite
mobile and intangible characteristics; they have the
potential of producing a significant turnover, and a
moderate extent of labour force is required to perform
the relevant functions concerned. These things com-
bined may perhaps render the sales factor vulnerable
and subject to manipulation at this point. Unwanted tax
competition responses may be the consequence.
US state income tax law provides some examples by
analogue of tax avoidance strategies that MNEs may
pursue in this area.82 First, reference can be made to a
Californian state income tax case involving a software
enterprise that obtained gross revenues from its sales of
short-term portfolio investments through the perform-
ing of a treasury function.83 It performed the function
involved at its headquarters in the State of Washington,
a state that does not levy a state income tax. The portfo-
lio investment revenues accounted for 73% of total
80. See footnote 65. Notably, I fail to see why the number of workers
would need to be taken into consideration in the composition of the
labour factor. Wage level differentials are a consequence of labour mar-
ket imperfections – or at least an issue analytically separate from taxa-
tion. In my view, these should not be sought to be ‘corrected’ through
a tax base allocation system.
81. A similar approach may be feasible regarding the asset factor (nexus:
‘asset values in EU Member State A exceeding amount € x’; allocation:
‘assets functionally utilised in EU Member State A’).
82. References to US state income tax case law and legislation were drawn
from Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237-241.
83. See Microsoft, above n. 73.
gross receipts (while producing less than 2% of net
income). These revenues accordingly overshadowed the
company’s core outputs, the selling of software. As a
result, significant amounts of state income tax base were
at risk of being shifted towards Washington, which
would leave it untaxed. The California Supreme Court
resolved the matter by requiring the software company
to apply the sales factor to the net portfolio investment
income. Referring to the language used in the CCCTB
proposal – ‘total sales’, ‘proceeds’, ‘revenues’84 – this
solution may, however, be unavailable under the
CCCTB.
Second, reference can be made to another Californian
state income tax case, which deals with the application
of the sales factor on gross receipts from the sales of
commodity futures that had been made to hedge against
price fluctuations.85 The case involved an enterprise
engaged in the selling of grain products like flour and
cereal. The company engaged in hedging transactions to
insure itself against fluctuations in the cost prices of the
raw grain materials that it used in its business process.
These enabled it to cancel out grain price fluctuation
risks to stabilise its profit margins. The company func-
tionally managed its hedging positions at its headquar-
ters located in Minnesota. The Californian Court ruled
that the gross receipts from the selling of commodity
futures were included in the sales factor. As the under-
taken hedging transactions produced substantial turn-
over (not profit), a significant part of the state income
tax base was shifted from California to Minnesota. The
California state income tax legislature responded by
excluding amounts received from such hedging transac-
tions from the sales factor per 1 January 2011.86 Assum-
ing that this issue may arise under the CCCTB by ana-
logue – and I do not see why it would not – the CCCTB
appears to be in need of being amended at this point
also.
3.3.3.3 Ad. 3 ‘Sales Factor Inflation’ through
‘Shareholding-Revenues-Carousels’
Moreover, the sales factor apportions exempt sharehold-
ing revenues like dividends and capital gains to the ben-
eficiary also. Notably, eligible shareholding proceeds
will be exempt from the tax base under the CCCTB’s
‘participation exemption regime’.87 It is these I refer to.
The apportioning of the tax base by reference to the
group member functionally performing the MNE’s
(third-country) shareholding management functions
may trigger the risk of initiating a process whereby
intra-group third-country transactions are set up to
84. See Art. 95.
85. See General Mills v. Franchise Tax Board, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1535, 92
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 208 (1st Dist. 2009). McIntyre, above n. 55, addresses an
equivalent issue at 286.
86. Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 25120(f)(2)(L) (Westlaw 2011).
87. See Art. 11(c)(d) in conjunction with Arts. 95(2) and 96(3).
payroll EU Member State A = payroll *
working days employers in EU Member State A
working days employers in EU
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inflate the sales factor. It is conceivable that MNE
groups would set up special vehicles for tax planning
purposes to which the (third-country) shareholding
interests are being legally assigned, that is, to subse-
quently inflate the sales factor via third-country intra-
group transactions. Under the composition of the sales
factor, MNEs seem enabled to do that. They may be
able to inflate the sales factor by establishing an ongoing
process of extracting dividend streams from their (third-
country) shareholdings financed with capital contribu-
tions.88 Such an establishing of circular dividend and
capital contribution streams does not seem to affect the
tax base in an upward sense, owing to the application of
the participation exemption. Yet, these exempt proceeds
are recognised as allocable proceeds for tax base sharing
purposes under the sales factor. The receipts from such
sales factor inflating ‘shareholding-revenue-carousels’
have the potential of fully eclipsing real outputs. Such
tax planning operations may particularly appear, I imag-
ine, in cases involving shareholdings in third-country
entities in which the CCCTB group has a controlling
interest, that is, intra-group cash-carousels across the
water’s edge. Taking into account that the anti-abuse
rules in the CCCTB proposal do not seem to cover fac-
tor manipulation, the sales factor seems very vulnerable
at this point.
The CCCTB proposal accordingly seems to potentially
grant MNEs complete discretion as to the intra-EU
attribution of the sales factor. The consequence may be
that an additional one-third of the EU-wide tax base
instantly becomes mobile as of the entry into force of
the CCCTB Directive. Obviously, the reality of such a
planning tool may ultimately depend on the interpreta-
tion of the terms ‘beneficiary’, ‘the ordinary course of
trade or business’, ‘total sales’, ‘proceeds’, ‘revenues’
and ‘exempt revenues’.
The issue may be substantially mitigated to the extent
that these would need to be interpreted as not to include
portfolio investment proceeds, hedging transactions
proceeds and revenues to which the CCCTB participa-
tion exemption applies. Under such an interpretation,
the respective proceeds would be excluded from the
sales factor and could not affect the apportioning of the
taxable base as a consequence. However, this does not
seem to correspond with the language used. Arbitrage
potentials may therefore be considered present, at least
theoretically.
If the aforementioned arbitrage would nevertheless
hold, potentially two-thirds of the EU-wide tax base is
at risk of being artificially shifted across the EU upon
the CCCTB’s entry into force. This may be considered
particularly problematical, since it may be infeasible to
strike down profit shifting through factor manipulation
under the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules. The CCCTB
88. The dividend streams may be financed with equity, but perhaps even
with intra-group third-country debt. The financing of such cash-carrou-
sels with intra-group debt may potentially even negatively affect the EU
tax base as the outbound intra-group interest payments involved may
be tax-deductible. Perhaps such interest deductions may end up being
restricted under the anti-abuse rules.
would accordingly provide MNEs readily available tools
to engage in artificial tax base shifting.
This matter may arise in addition to the vulnerability of
the EU tax base of being subject to traditional base ero-
sion and profit-shifting operations across the water’s
edge. The CCCTB, as already noted, would basically
operate as a conventional corporate tax across the
water’s edge, consequently triggering conventional tax
planning opportunities. In view of this, it seems that
future tax planning within the EU would occur in two
steps. First, the EU-wide tax base would be eroded via
traditional tax planning across the water’s edge. Second,
the eroded EU-wide tax base would be artificially
shifted for up to two-thirds to the comparatively lowest
EU Member State taxing jurisdiction.
If the CCCTB proposal were enacted as currently pro-
posed, the CCCTB accordingly seems to bear the
potential to reinvigorate aggressive tax planning opera-
tions and fierce tax competition responses of EU Mem-
ber States attempting to attract the (eroded) tax base.
Since the EU Member States would only have the tax
rate at their disposal to affect MNE location decisions,
perhaps the CCCTB may initiate an unforeseen ‘race to
the bottom 2.0’.
To be honest, I do not really see why these issues would
not arise. Of course, it could be decided to wait and see
how the Court of Justice will interpret the language
used. Perhaps the court will help the EU Member
States also at this place by resolving the matter through
extensive interpretations of the directive text. Perhaps,
alternatively, it may be worth assessing the option of
structurally altering the composition of the sales factor
in the sharing mechanism. I would favour taking that
alternative approach, and advocate the following
changes to the sales factor:
– First, it may be worth considering introducing the
rule that only gross receipts that contribute to the
production of taxable income are to be included in
the sales factor.89 That would effectively cancel out
sales factor inflation opportunities through the afore-
mentioned cash-carousels involving exempt revenues.
The exempt proceeds would not affect the sales fac-
tor under the suggested approach. 90
– Second, drawing inspiration from the work undertak-
en in the US by the Multistate Tax Commission on
revising the Multistate Tax Compact,91 it may be
worth scrutinising the option of excluding from the
sales factor receipts from the performing of treasury
functions, cash-pooling functions, portfolio invest-
ment activities and hedging transactions.92 In the US,
the Uniformity Committee, for instance, has sug-
89. See for a comparison, Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 238: ‘[T]he US subna-
tional state sales factors … defined “gross receipts” … that they had to
generate apportionable income.’
90. Cf. WP 060, above n. 59, at 13; and Mayer, above n. 19, at 217.
91. The Multistate Tax Commission is an intergovernmental advisory state
tax agency. The Multistate Tax Compact, among others, provides for a
model state income tax statute from which the US states may draw
inspiration in designing their state income tax systems.
92. That is, unless the taxpayer is a securities dealer. See MTC 2012a,
above n. 63, at 14-18; and MTC 2012b, above n. 63.
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gested the following provision: ‘“Receipts”’ means
gross receipts of the taxpayer (…) that are received
from transactions and activity in the regular course of
the taxpayer’s trade or business; except that receipts
of a taxpayer other than a securities dealer from
hedging transactions and from the maturity, redemp-
tion, sale, exchange, loan or other disposition of cash
or securities, shall be excluded.’93 The adoption of an
equivalent approach in the CCCTB would perhaps
halt the arbitrage potentials referred to in the above.
– Third, it might be considered to adopt a ‘factor pres-
ence test’ under the sales factor as well. On the basis
of a sales factor presence test, nexus within a tax
jurisdiction would be established with reference to
the presence of gross receipts within that tax jurisdic-
tion. The establishing of the firm’s taxable presence
could be subject to a de minimis threshold (‘gross
receipts from customers located in EU Member State
A exceeding amount € x’).94 The inspiration for the
designing of such a tax-connecting factor could be
found in the distance sales rules in EU-VAT.95 The
subsequent allocation of the taxable base to that state
could be inspired on EU-VAT as well, particularly
the place of supply rules.96 Viz., these aim at locating
the customer in the destination jurisdiction. The
assigning of the tax base via that means would per-
haps effectively mitigate artificial tax base-shifting
incentives within the EU through sales factor manip-
ulation. Under the application of such a factor pres-
ence test, the shifting of the taxable base would
require a physical relocation of the MNE’s market-
place from one EU Member State to another – a
shifting of real firm outputs accordingly.97
4 Concluding Remarks
Would the CCCTB – if enacted as currently proposed –
provide incentives for MNEs to pursue artificial tax
base shifting within the EU? Could these potentially
invigorate the risk of undue governmental tax competi-
tion responses?
Obviously, things remain to be seen, but for now my
tentative answer is in the affirmative. Currently, the
93. See MTC 2012a, above n. 63, at 15. For discussion and critique see
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, ‘Comments on the MTC’s Proposed
Amendments to Article IV Of the Multistate Tax Compact’, Presented
to the MTC Public Hearing, Washington, DC, March 28, 2013, ‘State-
ment of Benjamin F. Miller for the Hearing on Proposed Amendments
to Article IV of the Multistate Tax Compact’, Washington D.C., March
28 and 29, 2013, and ‘Additional Comment by Benjamin F. Miller with
Respect to Testimony Offered at the Hearing of March 28, 2013 in
Washington D.C. Proposed Amendment to Section 17 of Article IV’.
94. See n. 65.
95. See Arts. 33 and 34 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November
2006 on the common system of value added tax.
96. See Title V – ‘place of taxable transactions’, Council Directive
2006/112/EC.
97. As said, a similar approach may be feasible for consistency reasons
regarding the asset factor (nexus: ‘asset values in EU Member State A
exceeding amount € x’; allocation: ‘assets functionally utilised in EU
Member State A’).
issue of harmful tax competition within the EU seems to
have been pushed back as a result of the soft law
approaches that were initiated in the late 1990s and early
2000s. However, if the CCCTB in its current draft is
enacted, there may be a risk that two-thirds of the EU-
wide tax base would become mobile, at least theoretical-
ly. Upon its entry into force, the CCCTB would per-
haps pave the way for ‘factor-manipulation’ operations,
for instance through ‘payroll group members’ and ‘ben-
eficiary group members’. Particularly the potential for
sales factor inflation through the aforementioned ‘cash-
carousels’ may produce undesirable effects.
Time will tell. Perhaps the issue will not arise in the
first place as a result of extensive judicial interpretations
of the language used in the directive text by the Court of
Justice. Perhaps matters will alternatively be resolved.
Maybe the anti-abuse approaches will prove applicable
after all. Perhaps the safeguard clause will operate effec-
tively, or maybe the Commission will prove to have suf-
ficient legislative powers to adopt delegated acts to
effectively counter factor manipulation. Perhaps not.
That may be considered problematical indeed, particu-
larly since the EU Member States in that case would
merely dispose of a single instrument to respond to
MNE tax planning operations – tax rate reduction. To
cancel out any potential for initiating a ‘race to the bot-
tom 2.0.’ upfront, it might be worth assessing some
alternatives to the sharing mechanism as currently
drafted. I would, for instance, favour using quantitative
‘factor presence tests’ to attribute the tax base to EU
Member States directly.38
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